Rowland, Ian. The Full Facts Book of Cold Reading. 7th edition. London: Ian Rowland Limited, 2019. This comprehensive, near-encyclopedic text is the most thorough exposition of the "science" of cold reading published to date. A must read.
[This is remarkably similar to a special operations approach. ItemA is a point from psychological operations (PSYOP)--'mobile truth,' ora reinterpretation of events rather than a fabrication. This maps backto the 'onion' approach to cover stories--the layers of misdirection arematters of interpretation that lead to inaccurate or incomplete conclusions.Outright falsehood would derail the deception, and leave exposed the existenceof deception planning. When people feel they already have the answers,they cease asking meaningful questions (a rule of thumb in intelligence:questions are where you ran out of answers; answers are where you ran outof questions). To rely upon backstopping that will clearly be disprovenwould lead the 'enemy' to perhaps reconsider and reinvestigate. Item Bis an attempt to create a robust set of alternatives by making them 'smooth'rather than discontinuous. This is a curiosity that may indicate flawsin the mindset of the author(s) of this section--professional intelligenceanalysts and operators are paranoid by necessity, and anything that looks'complete' is automatically suspect. No intelligence model is complete(intelligence has its own version of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem), thereis no 'perfect' knowledge in the real world. This bit of tradecraft optsfor 'too much of a good thing must be better,' but looking at such a modelshould make an intelligence professional break out in cold sweat. ItemsC through F are good elements--simplicity makes the plan easier to understandand implement (and the parallel, from the other side (those being deceived),is that analysts tend to favor Ockham's Razor--the simplest explanationis the one most likely to be true), creativity and novelty increase thepossibility for moral or material surprise, flexibility is essential indealing with the unexpected ("no plan survives contact"), and secrecy iscritical for plan success.]
Tradecraft The Art And Science Of Cold Reading.pdf
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[HUMINT is an art rather than a science because the assets are unpredictable;this is a significant reason why countries such as the U.S. have reliedso much on technical means and methods. The asset management process isinformative. Organizational knowledge is reviewed for what is needed, anda target is identified that may be able to supply the information. Thetarget is evaluated for suitability and a way to establish a relationship;the target is also modeled for profiling purposes--psychology is essential.Recruiting the target as an asset is achieved under a plausible pretextand cover identity. Blown contact is managed by hand-off to another officer,who attempts a different approach. Note that no major distinction is drawnbetween the asset knowing or not knowing the nature of the recruiting organization--eithernot a perceived risk (it may be considered 'filtered out' earlier in theprocess), or tradecraft not discussed here. Written promises, proof ofaffiliation, could provide leverage later in the relationship, or presentrisk, but again no mention of the issue. Testing the agent is structuredas a 'one-off'--not taking into account the complexities of such relationships.Training, if supplied, concentrates on operation security, communicationsecurity, basic tradecraft, observation skills, and coping with apprehension(indication that assets are not exfiltrated if in jeopardy, or otherwise'taken care of'). Recognition of the difficulty in running human assetsis interesting. This is Machiavelli's dilemma--is it better to be lovedor feared? Note the comment in the 'second point of view' regarding "Ibelieve that the Islamic Military organization can combine the two techniques"--anopinion, not a judgment, meaning not something well seasoned by considerableexperience. These comments may be added by a less experienced operator.Note that asset 'termination' leaves the asset in place, with no concernsabout turning, blowback, or decommissioning. The 'means for testing therecruit' are wishful thinking--ability to monitor the key elements of covertwork imply an asset-in-place (possible, given the comment about 'informationthat the Organization knows well'); overpayment is a questionable test(contact procedures would prohibit actual counting of money during a meeting;significant sums should be transferred in self-confirming ways (funds transfer));tampering with documents is again questionable (detection requires an untamperedreference; how would an asset know quite what to tamper with?). Locationof this section and its content would tend to indicate later addition (again,by less competent personnel).] 2ff7e9595c
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